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ABSTRACT 
Extending the literature that has focused thus far on stock price impact, this study 
investigates the effect of data breach announcements on market activity, specifically 
through the response of the bid-ask spread and trading volume. We investigate data breach 
announcements as a potential source of asymmetric information and provide a new 
dimension to the ongoing debate on market efficiency. Adopting an event study 
methodology on a sample of 74 data breaches from 2005 to 2014, we find that data breach 
announcements have a positive short-term effect on both bid-ask spread and trading 
volume. The effect is only evidenced however on the day of the event, with market 
efficiency ensuring a quick return to normal market activity. No abnormal trading activity 
emerges before announcements, so there is no evidence in our study that these types of 
events are being exploited by informed market participants. The magnitude of event day 
effects is found to be more pronounced for large breaches, and when the breach involves 
lost devices.  
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The Effect of Data Breach Announcements Beyond The Stock Price: Empirical 
Evidence on Market Activity 
ABSTRACT 
Extending the literature that has focused thus far on stock price impact, this study 
investigates the effect of data breach announcements on market activity, specifically 
through the response of the bid-ask spread and trading volume. We investigate data 
breach announcements as a potential source of asymmetric information and provide a 
new dimension to the ongoing debate on market efficiency. Adopting an event study 
methodology on a sample of 74 data breaches from 2005 to 2014, we find that data 
breach announcements have a positive short-term effect on both bid-ask spread and 
trading volume. The effect is only evidenced however on the day of the event, with 
market efficiency ensuring a quick return to normal market activity. No abnormal 
trading activity emerges before announcements, so there is no evidence in our study that 
these types of events are being exploited by informed market participants. The 
magnitude of event day effects is found to be more pronounced for large breaches, and 
when the breach involves lost devices. 
Keywords: Data Breach, Stock Market, Bid-Ask Spread, Trading Volume, Event 
Study. 
JEL Codes: G12, G14, O30 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade the amount of data collected, processed and stored by firms has grown 
exponentially and this tendency will probably continue in the next years (LaValle et al., 
2011). Data analytics has been, and still is, reshaping many industries (Minelli et al., 
2012) e.g. healthcare, banking, finance and media and communications, but it also 
raises a firms’ activity risk (Chen et al., 2012). Stored data are usually highly sensitive 
and extremely valuable thus they attract the attention of cyber criminals; as a result, the 
number and the cost of incidents have grown significantly in the last decade (Ponemon, 
2015; Verizon, 2015) and cyber security has become a key issue for both managers and 
regulators (Deloitte, 2016; George, 2016; Hulme, 2015; SEC, 2014, 2016). 
Within this context, we analyse the impact of data breach announcements on market 
activity, in order to investigate the presence of informed trading and test for market 
efficiency around this new corporate event type. We extend the existing literature that to 
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date has focused on stock price impact and the effect on corporates. We move attention 
to the broader issue of market activity and address concerns of relevance to the wider 
investment community. A number of contributions are made. 
First, we analyse bid-ask spread determination through analysing data breach 
announcements as a potential source of asymmetric information between market dealers 
and uninformed liquidity traders, and informed traders. A myriad of corporate events 
have been studied to date including earnings announcements (Affleck‐Graves et al., 
2002; Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Lee et al., 1993; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986); auditor 
change (Hagigi et al., 1993); stock repurchases (Franz et al., 1995); management 
earnings forecasts (Coller and Yohn, 1997); bankruptcy (Frino et al., 2007) and merger 
and acquisition (Chan et al., 2015). Heretofore however, market activity around data 
breach announcements has not been studied. Furthermore, data breaches have particular 
characteristics compared to other corporate events. Data breach events are truly 
unexpected, both in terms of timing and frequency of occurrence (Ko et al., 2009), 
which is an advantage in a study like this. Many of the corporate events studied to date 
are expected, to varying degrees, and primary interest lies in deviations from market 
expectations. Mergers and acquisitions come closest to unexpected events (Augustin et 
al., 2015), but are not truly unexpected given the protracted nature of the associated 
negotiations and strategic manoeuvrings by the players involved. Data breaches 
therefore present a fresh testing ground to analyse market behaviour. 
Second, we conduct a round of testing on trading volume as an alternative measure of 
market activity, to investigate whether there is consistency with our findings on the bid-
ask spread. While the effect of (expected or unexpected) corporate events on pricing is 
unambiguous, namely the widening of the bid-ask spread to protect market dealers from 
uninformed traders, the effect on trading volume is, to the contrary, ambiguous and 
more nuanced. One school of thought suggests that trading volume may increase in the 
presence of asymmetric information, resulting from the exogeneity and inelasticity of 
uninformed liquidity trading (Kyle, 1985; Chae, 2005), while another suggests that 
trading volume may decrease in the presence of asymmetric information, where it is 
assumed in this case that liquidity traders have timing discretion (Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1988; Foster and Viswanathan, 1990; Chae 2005). Either way, the suggested abnormal 
volume effects correspond to informed traders optimizing their advantage over market 
dealers and uninformed liquidity traders.  
Third, we examine the duration of abnormal trading activity, if it exists, post data 
breach announcements. How fast the market absorbs new information is at the core of 
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the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970). Other corporate events that have been 
analysed in the past show mixed evidence as to whether markets are efficient or not. 
Our analysis sheds new light on this topic of market efficiency, showing to what extent 
the market monitors and responds to emerging news on the modern corporate 
phenomenon of data breaches.  
Finally, we examine the factors that may determine the magnitude and direction of 
impacts on market activity from data breach events. Informed by the literature, we 
consider the size of the breach as a possible factor, positing that impacts are more 
pronounced for larger breaches relative to smaller breaches. We also examine whether 
the type of breach that has occurred is a factor, and whether the consequences of a data 
breach depend on the industry in which a breached firm operates. Analysing the impact 
of data breach announcements on market activity across these dimensions adds 
additional insight to the existing evidence on stock price response. 
Using a dataset of 74 data breaches, involving US publicly traded firms over the period 
2005 to 2014, we assess the impact of the associated announcements on market activity. 
We find evidence of a positive short-term impact of data breach announcement on bid-
ask spread and trading volume. The effect is only evidenced however on the day of the 
event, with market efficiency ensuring a quick return to normal market activity. No 
abnormal trading activity emerges before announcements, providing evidence that these 
types of events are not being exploited by informed market participants. The effect on 
bid-ask spread is evidenced to be more pronounced for events that involve a large 
number of records or that involve lost devices; the effect on trading volume is 
evidenced to be more pronounced for larger firms and for events that involve lost 
devices. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature and formally states the research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data. 
Section 4 discusses the research design. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical 
analysis. Section 6 reports some important concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The number of incidents affecting information systems is growing every year and actual 
and emerging trends such as social media, cloud computing, mobile devices and big 
data exacerbate this issue (Abbasi et al., 2016; Romanosky et al., 2014). Goldstein et al. 
(2011) classify such events into two main categories, namely data-related and function-
related events. A data-related event is any threat to the confidentiality of data assets that 
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can result in the disclosure, misuse, or destruction of these assets. A function-related 
event, instead, is any threat to the availability or to the integrity of functional 
information systems (that may eventually affect data assets). Although both event types 
impose significant costs to the affected companies, such costs are due to different 
causes and are spread differently over time. Short-term costs of data events are mainly 
related to investigation and remediation activities, legal advisory and fines, while long-
term costs are related to loss of present and future revenues and deterioration of 
customers’ or partners’ trust (Cavusoglu et al., 2004). Short-term costs of function 
events include losses in terms of lost productivity and lost transactions (Paquette et al., 
2010), as well as remediation costs that can vary depending on the type of incident 
(Charette et al., 1997; Dennis et al., 2015), while long-term costs are related to loss of 
growth opportunities (Bharadwaj et al., 1999) and inefficiencies (Arend, 2004). 
Regardless of the event type, a breach imposes significant costs on the affected firm.  
Famous cases of data and function events are ChoicePoint and Nasdaq. In early 2006, 
ChoicePoint paid a $10 million fine as a result of its breach and another $5 million to a 
fund to compensate affected individuals (FTC, 2009). In 2012, the websites of 
exchanges Nasdaq and BATS suffered a 24-hour attack that led to intermittent service 
disruptions (Krudy, 2012) and to a 12 percent decrease in daily US stock trading 
activity (Savitz, 2012). 
Given that the overall cost of a breach includes many different components, and that 
such components span over different periods of time, the quantification of such a cost is 
extremely complex. The change in stock price following the data breach announcement 
is often adopted as a proxy. This assumption is based on the semi-strong Efficient 
Market Hypothesis as stated by Fama (1970). Following this hypothesis, a stock price 
incorporates all public information and all future expected firm cash flows. The 
majority of existing empirical studies focus on the wider category of security breaches 
and they analyse typically small samples. Campbell et al. (2003) analyse 43 events from 
1995 to 2000 and they find no statistically significant abnormal returns except for 11 
events, which involve confidential data, where stock prices drop by 5.5 percent over a 
three-day period around the announcement. Garg et al. (2003) examine 22 information 
security incidents from 1996 to 2002 and they find an average share price decline of -
5.3 percent over a three-day period following the announcement. Hover and D’Arcy 
(2003) examine 23 denial-of-service (DOS) attacks between 1998 and 2002, and they 
show no statistically significant stock price response. Cavusoglu et al. (2004) analyse 66 
events from 1996 to 2001 and they provide evidence of an average abnormal return of -
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2.1 percent over a two-day window following the event. They also demonstrate that the 
breach cost is higher for those firms that rely only on the Internet for doing business, 
and that this cost is not significantly different across breach types.  
The conflicting results of these studies may be due to event choice since they typically 
analyse security breach events or a mixture of security and data breaches. Such events 
are different from each other and some of them may have non-significant economic 
impact. To the extent of our knowledge, only Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) examine 
data breach events as defined above. Their sample includes only events that involve 
employees’ or customers’ personal information. Their analysis of 77 events from 2004 
to 2006 shows a decline in share price of 0.84 percent over a two-day time window 
starting from the announcement day and that the breach effect is more significant in the 
most recent period of the analysis.  
While the impact of breach announcements on financial markets is garnering greater 
attention, existing studies focus solely on price reaction (i.e. abnormal returns). None 
have investigated other important aspects of trading activity, such as the bid-ask spread 
and trading volume. Bid-ask spread and trading volume are well-established proxies to 
detect informed trading and allow for an examination of the effect of temporary 
information advantages that informed investors might hold (Chae, 2005; Pinder, 2003). 
We are motivated to take the dual approach of analysing bid-ask spread and trading 
volume together in our study given that data breach events have not been considered to 
date in this context. While the trading volume analysis provides a robustness check to 
the bid-ask spread analysis that we perform, informed trading effects on trading volume 
are more nuanced and insightful. While the widening of the bid-ask spread to protect 
market dealers in the presence of informed trading is an expected effect, trading volume 
may either increase or decrease depending on the market reaction to informed trading; 
the former case corresponding to exogeneity and inelasticity of uninformed liquidity 
trading (Kyle, 1985; Chae, 2005) and the latter case corresponding to the case of timing 
discretion on the part of uninformed liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; 
Foster and Viswanathan, 1990; Chae 2005).  
 
2.1 Hypothesis development 
 
According to previous studies, the bid-ask spread is a function of the costs related to the 
dealers' order processing, inventory-holding, and adverse selection (Affleck-Graves et 
al., 2000; Aitken et al., 2004; Pinder, 2003). The early microstructure literature 
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emphasises the first two components of the spread, predicting that the spread increases 
with price volatility and decreases with price level, trading volume and competitive 
pressure (Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Demsetz, 1968). Later, Copeland and Galai 
(1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) incorporated informed trading risk as a spread 
component. These models are based on the idea that market dealers face two types of 
traders: uninformed liquidity traders and informed traders. While liquidity traders trade 
on public information, informed traders trade on private information and, therefore, they 
buy (sell) only when the stock is undervalued (overvalued). As a consequence, market 
dealers always lose against informed traders and thus they have to increase the spread to 
liquidity traders in order to recover their losses to informed traders. For this reason, it is 
predicted that the spread is positively related to the proportion of informed trading.  
A large number of studies address bid-ask behaviour around company announcements, 
such as earnings announcements (Affleck‐Graves, et al., 2002; Bushee et al., 2010; 
Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Lee, et al., 1993; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986), auditor change 
(Hagigi, et al., 1993), stock repurchases (Franz, et al., 1995), management earnings 
forecasts (Coller and Yohn, 1997), bankruptcies (Frino, et al., 2007) and mergers and 
acquisitions (Chan, et al., 2015). However, to our knowledge, this is the first study that 
investigates the impact of data breach announcements on the bid-ask spread. A data 
breach announcement should be completely unexpected (Ko et al., 2009). Security 
breach notification laws (SBNLs) passed at state level in the US require firms to 
disclose data breaches promptly in order to limit possible harm (Romanosky et al., 
2014). Furthermore, the laws require confidentiality to be maintained around data 
breaches in the interim (Winn 2009), in principle allowing no scope for abnormal 
trading prior to the announcement. This implies that no information asymmetry, and 
therefore no abnormal trading activity, should be detected before the announcement 
(Frino, et al., 2007). Instead, on the announcement day, and possibly in the days 
following the announcement, an abnormal level of spread may be expected due to the 
information shock, which creates higher uncertainty and, therefore, increases the risk of 
exposure to informed trading. These considerations lead to the following research 
hypotheses: 
    H1(a): bid-ask spread does not increase before the announcement of a data 
breach; 
   H1(b): a data breach announcement increases the bid-ask spread. 
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Rejection of H1(a) would signal a response of market dealers to abnormal trading 
activity in the days leading up to data breach announcements. It is this situation that 
would point to the use of non-public information around data breach events by informed 
traders. On the other hand, acceptance of H1(b) would signal the usual response of 
market dealers in widening bid-ask spreads over fears of losses to informed traders. Our 
examination of data breach announcements over a defined event window provides 
important insights into how quickly information around data breach events gets 
assimilated by equity markets; reflected in the narrowing of the bid-ask spread to 
normal trading levels. 
A second way to consider the presence of informed trading is analysing trading volume. 
Trading volume in financial markets plays a critical role since it facilitates the price 
discovery process, enables investors to share financial risks, and ensures that 
corporations can raise funds needed for investment (Chae, 2005). The effect of 
informed trading on trading volume is ambiguous. One school of thought suggests that 
trading volume may increase in the presence of asymmetric information, resulting from 
the exogeneity and inelasticity of uninformed liquidity trading, while another suggests 
that trading volume may decrease in the presence of asymmetric information, where it is 
assumed in this case that liquidity traders have timing discretion (Chae, 2005). Milgrom 
and Stokey (1982), Black (1986) and Wang (1994) show that uninformed traders 
participate less in the market when there is a higher possibility of trading with informed 
traders in order to avoid losses. Chae (2005) confirms this finding comparing trading 
volume around scheduled (i.e. earnings) and unscheduled (i.e. acquisition, target, bond 
rating change) announcements. The author demonstrates that trading volume decreases 
before scheduled announcements due to information asymmetry.  
Given that firms should announce a data breach promptly under SBNLs requirements 
in order to limit possible harm (Romanosky et al., 2014), such events should be 
unanticipated and no abnormal trading volume should appear before the 
announcement (Chae, 2005). Abnormal trading volume, instead, may emerge after 
the announcement due to the information release. In addition, given that a data 
breach announcement is typically anything but neutral, we predict that the trading 
volume would be higher than usual since traders will be inclined to sell to avoid 
possible losses. We therefore propose the following hypotheses: 
   H2(a): trading volume does not increase before the announcement of a data 
breach; 
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   H2(b): a data breach announcement increases trading volume. 
Rejection of H2(a) would again signal the presence of informed trading prior to the 
data breach announcements, while acceptance of H2(b) would signal a response of 
market dealers to the potential for losses to informed traders. 
To expand the analysis further, we consider next the factors that may determine the 
magnitude and direction of impacts on market activity from data breach events. 
Although a data breach is usually a negative event for effected firms and their 
shareholders, the size of the breach (i.e. number of records breached) may exacerbate 
the consequences. Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) include this factor in their model 
but they do not find any significant effect on returns. Notwithstanding this, larger 
breaches should be associated with greater implicit and explicit costs and we expect 
that they have a larger impact than more minor events both on spread, since they create 
higher uncertainty, and trading volume, since they may cause a more significant drop in 
share price and investors may be more willing to sell stocks to avoid significant losses. 
We therefore consider the following additional hypotheses: 
H3(a): The impact of data breach announcements on bid-ask spread is positive 
and more pronounced for larger than for smaller breaches; 
H3(b): The impact of data breach announcements on trading volume is positive 
and more pronounced for larger than for smaller breaches. 
Existing studies argue that the impact of a breach announcement depends also on the 
type of breach that occurred. Campbell et al. (2003) divide their sample based on the 
confidentiality or non-confidentiality of exposed information and demonstrate that 
breaches involving confidential data have a negative and significant effect on a firm’s 
value. However, Cavusoglu et al. (2004) distinguish between events whose objective is 
to compromise data availability and all the others but they do not find any significant 
difference. Furthermore, Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) classify the events in their 
sample as active, stolen or lost, but find no significant differential impact. Given the 
mixed evidence, we state our research hypotheses in the following null form: 
H4(a): The impact of data breach announcements on bid-ask spread does not 
depend on breach type; 
H4(b): The positive impact of data breach announcement on trading volume does 
not depend on breach type. 
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3. Data 
In this paper we adopt an event study methodology to investigate the impact of data 
breach announcements on two dimensions of market activity: the bid-ask spread and 
trading volume. We build our sample starting from a list of breaches, which occurred 
from January 2005 to December 2014, as compiled by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse.
 1
 
The initial list consisted of 4,483 events, of which we excluded 4,152 for being related 
to non-publicly traded firms. For the remaining sample of 331 events, we searched the 
LexisNexis database for possible confounding events
2
 during the seven days before the 
announcement and 58 events were excluded on this basis. We also checked whether the 
events in our sample were reported in newspapers before the official announcement 
date. It turned out that 26 events matched this criterion and in these cases we adjusted 
the event date back to reflect the date of the first newspaper article. From the remaining 
273 events, we excluded 149 events with unknown number of records breached in order 
to ensure we focused only on events that can be classified as a data breach. Events with 
undisclosed number of records, indeed, might be security breach events. As such, they 
tend to have a marginal impact on the affected firms in terms of fines and reputation 
damage, and might bias the results. We also deleted 14 further events on the basis that 
the same company had a breach during the 132 days before the announcement; this was 
necessary to ensure that the estimation period of the analysis is not affected by previous 
events. As a final step, we excluded another 37 events because of missing data. Our 
final sample therefore consists of 74 events
3
. Table 1 summarises the sampling process. 
Table 2 provides relative frequencies of events over time, while Table 3 reports the 
number of events per industry. 
We retrieved daily equity data (i.e. closing price, high price, low price, volume and 
common shares outstanding) on the associated companies from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. The ownership structure data was obtained from BoardEx. It is important to 
note that while we have 74 data breaches, these relate to 62 individual companies. 
Insert Table 1 here 
                                                 
1 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is a California based nonprofit corporation. The organization looks to, among other activities, 
identify trends in privacy protection and communicate its findings to advocates, policymakers, industry, media and consumers. 
Detailed information on data breaches is available at http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach. We use this source to identify the 
data breach events studied in this paper. 
2 Following Hollander and Prokop (2015), we considered earnings announcements, merger and acquisitions announcements, capital 
increases, investment or disinvestments announcements, public offerings, rating actions, and restructuring announcements as 
confounding events. 
3 The limited sample size reflects the data availability and the need to apply adequate filters in order to reduce possible noises. Both 
the sampling criteria and the size of our sample are in line with previous studies on the same topic (Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Gatzlaff 
and McCullogh 2010; Gordon et al. 2011). 
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Insert Table 2 here 
Insert Table 3 here 
4. Research design 
In performing our event study, we set a 126-day estimation window (-132,-6)
4
, while 
our analysis period consists of 11 trading days centred on the event day (-5,+5). 
Following McLean and Pontiff (2016), Koch et al. (2016), and Easley et al. (2016), we 
estimate the daily bid-ask spread as proposed by Corwin and Schultz (2012). Corwin 
and Schultz (2012) provide a way to estimate the bid-ask spread from daily high and 
low prices. Their simulation reveals that the correlation between the spread estimated 
through such a methodology and the spread using trades and quotes data is about 0.9. 
Other low-frequency estimation methodologies include Roll (1984), Lesmond et al. 
(1999), and Holden (2009). However, Corwin and Schultz (2012) demonstrate that their 
model performs better than others. In our estimation, we consider the adjustments for 
overnight price changes and negative spread estimates as suggested by the authors.  
We then estimate the abnormal bid-ask spread as suggested by Bushee et al. (2010), 
Blankerspoon et al. (2014) and Michels (2016): 
                      (1) 
               
  
      
      (2) 
where        is the bid-ask spread on day t associated with event i,          is the 
abnormal bid-ask spread on day t associated with event i, and       is the average 
normal bid-ask spread associated with event i as calculated over the estimation period. 
In the forthcoming section, we present the results of our formal testing of the cross-
sectional average abnormal bid-ask spreads: 
               
 
  
        
  
   
              
                                                 
4 Benninga (2008) recommends a 252-day estimation period or longer, but the author also states that the minimum requirement is 
126 days. In this paper we opt for the minimum requirement in order to preserve the sample size. A longer estimation period would 
narrow down the sample size to 71 because of the event overlapping. As a robustness test we perform the analysis adopting a 252-
day estimation period and the results do not change. Results available from the authors on request. 
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In order to investigate which factors affect the bid-ask spread and whether the impact of 
the announcement is larger for specific industries or not, we also implement a 
regression analysis. The empirical model is presented in Equation (3): 
                                                           
                                          
                                   
           
    
            
(3) 
The dependent variable (ABAS) is the abnormal bid-ask spread on the event day (day 0). 
We include four types of independent variables. Firstly, we include some important 
determinants of the bid-ask spread drawn from the literature (Aitken and Frino, 1996; 
Aitken, et al., 2004; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Gorkittisunthorn et al., 2006; Stoll, 
1978). Price is the natural logarithm of the closing price and it proxies for dealer’s 
ordering cost. Turnover is stock daily turnover and it proxies for inventory-holding cost. 
Var is a measure of the daily stock price volatility and proxies for dealer’s inventory-
holding risk. Other than order processing and inventory-holding, bid-ask spread might 
be also positively related to informed trading, which is captured in the intercept term. 
Secondly, we include control variables for company characteristics such as the natural 
log of market capitalisation (MarketCap), the book-to-market ratio (BMRatio), the 
leverage ratio (Leverage), and the percentage of shares owned by the CEO (Ownership) 
all measured at the end of the fiscal year prior the breach. Thirdly, in order to control for 
event characteristics, we include in the regression model the natural logarithm of the 
number of records breached (BreachScale), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm 
experienced a data breach before and 0 otherwise (PriorBreach) (Gatzlaff and 
McCullough 2010). Following Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010), we also consider a set 
of dummy variables to control for the type of breach, namely Active, Stolen, Lost, and 
Unknown. Active is a dummy variable equal to 1 if it is evident in the description of the 
data breach that the intent of the breach was to steal personal data, and 0 otherwise. 
Stolen is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the description of the data breach reveals that a 
device containing personal data has been stolen and it is unknown whether the intent of 
the breach was to steal personal data, and 0 otherwise. Lost is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the description of the data breach reveals that a device containing personal data 
has been lost or misplaced, and 0 otherwise. All the events which cannot be classified as 
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Active, Stolen or Lost are considered to have unknown causes (Unknown) and are used 
as baseline in our empirical model. We therefore define BreachType = {Active, Stolen, 
Lost}. Fourthly, we control for differential announcement impact among different 
industries, considering the manufacturing industry (Manufacturing) as baseline. We 
therefore define the set of sector dummy variables Industry = {Public, Transportation, 
Wholesale, Retail, Finance, Services}, corresponding to the industry sectors set out in 
Table 3.  
To investigate the effect of data breaches on trading volume, we adopt the daily stock 
turnover for the tests in this paper. Turnover is defined as trading volume divided by 
outstanding shares. Compared to the raw trading volume, it corrects for the number of 
outstanding shares so it allows a cleaner interpretation of the results (Chae, 2005). 
Following Chae (2005), we estimate the abnormal turnover over the analysis period as 
follows: 
                         (4) 
                 
  
      
      (5) 
where          is the turnover on day t associated with event i,           is the 
abnormal turnover on day t associated with event i, and       is the average normal 
turnover associated with event i as calculated over the estimation period. 
In the forthcoming section, we present the results of our formal testing of the cross-
sectional average abnormal turnovers: 
                  
 
  
         
  
   
              
To analyse what factors predict change in trading volume and whether the 
announcement impact is different in different industries we also implement a regression 
analysis, akin to the bid-ask spread case. Following Chae (2005), we regress the 
abnormal turnover on information asymmetry, risk and price impact. The resulting 
empirical model is presented in Equation (6): 
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(6) 
The dependent variable (ATURN) is the abnormal turnover on the announcement day 
(day 0). BAS is the bid-ask on the announcement day. All other variables are as 
previously defined. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 4 provides summary statistics. In particular, it is worth noting three points from 
this table. First, breached firms in our sample lost, on average, 2.53 percent of their 
value during the event day and the day following the event. Second, both the abnormal 
bid-ask spread and the abnormal turnover in the announcement day are, on average, 
positive. Third, the number of records breached ranges from 11 (Citigroup, October 2, 
2006) to 145 million (Ebay, May 21, 2014) so we adopt a log transformation in the 
regression analysis; furthermore, the average value is highly influenced by very large 
events so we replicate the regression analysis
5
 excluding the largest (five percent of) 
events to ensure that our results are not biased by any outliers. 
Insert Table 4 here 
Table 5 presents the results of the event study analysis on the daily average abnormal 
bid-ask spread over the analysis period (-5,+5). It shows a significant and positive 
impact of data breach announcements on the bid-ask spread on the day of the 
announcement. The average value is larger than the days before and after the event, 
with this result being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that 
market dealers widen the spreads following the announcement. This allows us to accept 
H1(a) since no abnormal trading emerges before the announcements
6
. We equally 
                                                 
5 Results available from the authors on request. 
6 Although a statistically significant impact on bid-ask spread is recorded on day -4, it is notable that the result is negative, 
suggesting a tightening, rather than a widening, of the bid-ask spread. No other day prior to the announcement shows any evidence 
of abnormal behavior. On this basis we conclude that there is no evidence of abnormal behavior prior to the announcement day. 
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accept H1(b) since the breach impact is positive and statistically significant. However, 
the effect is very short-lived, indeed lasting only the day of the announcement, showing 
that the market responds to the announcement efficiently. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Table 6 presents the results of the event study analysis on the daily trading volume over 
the analysis period. In a similar manner to bid-ask spread, the impact is positive and 
statistically significant, at the 5 percent level, only on the event day. This means that 
investors trade more on the announcement day only. We may therefore accept H2(a) 
since no abnormal trading emerges before the announcements
7
. This evidence 
corroborates our finding based on bid-ask spread and provides us with more confidence 
that informed trading on the back of data breach events is not a feature of the markets. 
Similar to before, we accept also H2(b) since the breach impact is positive and 
statistically significant, while the short-lived nature of the effect confirms that the 
market responds to the announcement efficiently. 
Insert Table 6 here 
To explore our data set further, we move to the H3-set of hypotheses, where we wish to 
ascertain if the breach size has an effect. The theoretical argument is that large breaches 
should be associated with larger implicit and explicit costs, and so we may expect that 
such breaches would have a larger impact than more minor events on both the bid-ask 
spread, since they create higher uncertainty, and trading volume, since they may cause a 
more significant drop in share price and investors may be more willing to sell stocks to 
avoid significant losses. We classify the events as large is they were assigned to the 
highest size tercile. Then we preform a t-test on the differences in abnormal bid-ask 
spread and trading volume between the two subsamples (i.e. large breaches vs 
small/medium breaches). Table 7 reports the results of the analysis. The results suggest 
that large breaches do indeed have a larger positive and significant (5 percent level) 
impact on the bid-ask spread than medium and small sized breaches, but not on trading 
volume. The results lead us to accept H3(a) and to reject H3(b). 
Insert Table 7 here 
                                                 
7 Although a statistically significant impact on trading volume is recorded on day -5, no other day prior to the announcement shows 
any evidence of abnormal behavior. On this basis we conclude that there is no evidence of abnormal behavior prior to the 
announcement day. 
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In order to investigate whether a differential impact exists depending on breach type, as 
per the set of hypotheses H4, and following the t-testing approach for breach size, we 
classify the following group pairings for analysis: Active v. Non-Active; Stolen v. Non-
Stolen; Lost v. Non-Lost; and Unknown v. Known according to the definitions provided 
above. Table 8 (Panel C) shows that, when compared to other events, those classified as 
Lost have a larger and statistically significant impact on both the bid-ask spread and the 
turnover (5 percent significance levels); in contrast those classified as Stolen (Panel B) 
have a larger and significant impact on turnover only (10 percent significance level). 
With only the Unknown and Known groups showing no statistically significant 
differences, we can viably reject H4(a) and H4(b) and come to the conclusion that the 
type of data breach is an important factor in determining the response of the market to 
the emerging news on the data breach announcement day. 
Insert Table 8 here 
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
Going beyond the mere detection of a significant impact of data breach announcements 
on the bid-ask spread and trading volume, we aim in this section to identify which 
factors influence such impacts. Table 9 reports the results of the regression model 
presented in Equation (3). Panel A shows that the abnormal bid-ask spread on the event 
day is positively related to stock price (Price) and volatility (Var). These results suggest 
that the bid-ask spread is positively related to dealers’ ordering cost (Price) and to 
inventory-holding risk (Var), while it is not affected by information asymmetry 
(embedded in the intercept term) and by inventory-holding time (Turnover). Panel B to 
Panel E present the results of the extended version of the model presented in Panel A, 
which control for any dependence on firm, event or industry characteristics. Results 
show that firms in the service industry (Service) tend to have a larger bid-ask spread 
reaction to the announcement. All other control variables are not significant showing 
that the change in bid-ask spread is not linked to firms or event characteristics. 
Insert Table 9 here 
Table 10 presents the results of the regression analysis on abnormal turnover following 
the model presented in Equation (6). Panel A shows that the abnormal trading volume 
on the event day is positively and significantly related to stock price (Price) and 
information asymmetry (BAS). Panel B to Panel E show that larger firms (MarketCap) 
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experience larger abnormal turnover on the announcement day. Results in Panel E also 
show that the announcement of a data breach made by a firm operating in the wholesale 
trade industry (Wholesale) tends to trigger a larger turnover reaction. 
Insert Table 10 here 
6. Conclusions 
We fill an important gap in the literature by means of analysing the impact of data 
breach announcements on market activity. Adopting an event study methodology, we 
find evidence of a short-term effect of data breach announcements on bid-ask spread 
and trading volume. Interestingly, no abnormal trading activity emerges before the 
announcement, confirming that these types of events are not being exploited by 
informed market participants. Our results also show that market dealers widen the bid-
ask spread because of trading costs and inventory-holding risk, and that the trading 
volume on the announcement day is positively related to information asymmetry and 
trading risk. 
Our results will be of interest and indeed valuable to a number of stakeholders. First and 
foremost, our evidence should provide investors with reassurance that data breach 
events seem not to be exploited by informed traders in the run up to public 
announcements. This has important implication for investment strategy. Secondary to 
this, regulators will be interested in the evidence for the absence of abnormal trading 
before data breach announcements. This provides some indirect evidence to the efficacy 
of the security breach notification laws that have been introduced across the United 
States in recent years.  
Our study should motivate further research into the understudied area of data breaches. 
A key limitation of our study is that the use of daily data does not allow us to separate 
buying and selling activity, which might follow different patterns over the analysis 
period. This presents an immediate future direction for this research.   
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Table 1 
Data set and applied filters 
    
  Number of events 
Filters Deleted Remaining 
Events reported by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2005-
2014) 
  4,483 
Non-publicly traded firms 4,152 331 
Events with possible confounding announcements  58 273 
Zero or unknown number of records breached 149 124 
Data breach in the estimation period 14 110 
Missing data 36 74 
Final Sample   74 
This table reports the number of observations deleted and remaining after each applied filter. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Frequency of data breaches per year 
Year Number of events Percentage 
2005 2 2.70 
2006 14 18.92 
2007 9 12.16 
2008 5 6.76 
2009 3 4.05 
2010 7 9.46 
2011 11 14.86 
2012 7 9.46 
2013 8 10.81 
2014 8 10.81 
Total 74 100 
This table reports the number of events and relative percentages for each 
year. 
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Table 3 
Frequency of data breaches per industry 
Industry SIC Codes 
Number of 
events 
Percentage 
Manufacturing 20-39 14 18.92 
Transportation 40-49 8 10.81 
Wholesale  50-51 2 2.70 
Retail 52-59 17 22.97 
Finance 60-67 24 32.43 
Services 70-89 8 10.81 
Public Administration 91-99 1 1.35 
Total   74 100 
This table reports the number of events and relative percentages for each industry. The industry 
classification is based on the 2-digit SIC codes category as reported on http://siccode.com/. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% 50% 75% 
CARs (0,1) -0.025 0.033 -0.043 -0.019 -0.002 
BAS 0.026 0.012 0.016 0.024 0.036 
ABAS 0.003 0.011 -0.005 0.000 0.011 
TURN 0.009 0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.003 
ATURN 0.137 0.558 -0.255 0.033 0.265 
Price 3.397 0.841 2.967 3.414 3.853 
Var 0.021 0.016 0.009 0.017 0.030 
MarketCap 9.964 1.688 8.900 9.864 11.454 
BMRatio 0.567 0.639 0.299 0.451 0.744 
Leverage 0.182 0.160 0.000 0.185 0.301 
BreachScale 8.948 3.794 6.252 8.517 11.318 
Ownership 0.333 2.348 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PriorBreach 0.427         
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This table reports summary statistics of  cumulative abnormal returns estimated through Fama and 
French three factors model (CARs), bid-ask spread on the announcement day (BAS), abnormal bid-ask 
spread on the announcement day (ABAS), stock turnover on the announcent day (TURN), abnormal 
stock turnover on the announcent day (ATURN), natural logarithm of the closing price on the 
announcement day (Price), stock price volatility on the announcement day (Var), natural logarithm of the 
market capitalisation at the end of the fiscal year prior to the breach (MarketCap), book-to-market ratio 
at the end of the fiscal year prior to the breach (BMRatio), leverage ratio (Leverage), natural logarithm 
of the number of records breached (BreachScale), the percentage of CEO ownership (Ownership), and a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm expeprienced a breach in the past, 0 otherwise (PriorBreach). 
Descriptive statistics include mean, standard deviation, first quartile (25%), median (50%), and third 
quartile (75%). 
 
 
Table 5 
Daily abnormal bid-ask spread 
Day ABAS p-value 
-5 -0.001 0.116   
-4 -0.002 0.041 ** 
-3 0.001 0.299   
-2 0.001 0.131   
-1 0.001 0.293   
0 0.003 0.005 *** 
1 0.001 0.327   
2 0.001 0.293   
3 0.000 0.665   
4 0.000 0.776   
5 -0.001 0.509   
This table reports the daily average abnormal bid-ask spread 
(ABAS), together with the p-values associated with the t-tests on 
their significance (H0: ABAS=0). 
*,**,*** Significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6 
Daily abnormal turnover 
Day ATURN p-value 
-5 0.001 0.041 ** 
-4 0.000 0.998   
-3 0.001 0.225   
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-2 0.000 0.495   
-1 0.000 0.724   
0 0.001 0.023 ** 
1 0.001 0.126   
2 0.000 0.839   
3 0.000 0.788   
4 0.000 0.803   
5 0.000 0.913   
This table reports the daily average abnormal stock turnover 
(ATURN), together with the p-values associated with the t-tests on 
their significance (H0: ATURN=0). 
*,**,*** Significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7 
Data breach size and market reaction 
Variable Large Small-Medium p-value 
ABAS 0.007 0.002 0.034 **  
ATURN 0.001 0.001 0.662 
 
This table reports the mean values of abnormal bid-ask spread (Panel A) and abnormal 
stock turnover (Panel B) on the announcement day by breach size, and the p-values 
associated with the t-tests on the significance of the difference between the two 
subsamples (H0: difference equal to 0). Events classification is based on tercile thresholds 
with large breaches falling in the third tercile. 
*,**,*** Significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 8 
Data breach type and market reaction 
Panel A: Data Breaches caused by active attacks 
Variable Active Non-Active p-value 
ABAS 0.004 0.003 0.744 
 
AVOL 0.001 0.001 0.874   
N 37 37   
Panel B: Data Breaches caused by stolen devices 
Variable Stolen Non-Stolen p-value 
ABAS 0.002 0.004 0.416 
 
AVOL 0.000 0.001 0.089 *  
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N 20 54   
Panel C: Data Breaches caused by lost devices 
Variable Lost Non-Lost p-value 
ABAS 0.011 0.002 0.027 ** 
AVOL 0.004 0.000 0.023 **  
N 10 64   
Panel D: Data Breaches whose causes are unknown/undisclosed 
Variable Unknown Known p-value 
ABAS 0.013 0.003 0.215 
 
AVOL 0.001 0.001 0.821   
N 7 67 
 
  
This table reports the mean values of abnormal bid-ask spread (Panel A) and abnormal 
stock turnover (Panel B) on the announcement day by breach type, and the p-values 
associated with the t-tests on the significance of the difference between the subsamples 
(H0: difference equal to 0). Event classification is based on Gatzlaff and McCullough 
(2010). 
 *,**,*** Significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9 
Regression analysis: abnormal bid-ask spread 
Variable Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
Intercept 
-0.001   -0.002   0.000   -0.002   -0.003   
(0.913)   (0.920)   (0.997)   (0.888)   (0.872) 
 
Price 
0.003 ** 0.002   0.002   0.001   0.001 
 
(0.047)   (0.169)   (0.214)   (0.286)   (0.401) 
 
Turnover 
0.002   0.003   0.002   0.002   0.001 
 
(0.475)   (0.267)   (0.284)   (0.418)   (0.572) 
 
Var 
0.313 *** 0.289 *** 0.288 *** 0.303 *** 0.327 *** 
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
 
MarketCap 
    0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001 
 
    (0.414)   (0.456)   (0.418)   (0.238) 
 
BMRatio 
    -0.003   -0.003   -0.003   -0.003 
 
    (0.191)   (0.190)   (0.180)   (0.240) 
 
Leverage 
  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002  -0.006  
  (0.629)  (0.606)  (0.793)  (0.612)  
Ownership 
  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  
  (0.291)  (0.252)  (0.356)  (0.958)  
BreachScale 
        0.000   0.000   0.000 
 
        (0.603)   (0.618)   (0.795) 
 
PriorBreach         0.000   -0.001   0.000 
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        (0.861)   (0.807)   (0.992) 
 
Active 
            0.003   0.002 
 
            (0.560)   (0.592) 
 
Stolen 
            -0.002   -0.004 
 
            (0.710)   (0.423) 
 
Lost 
            0.001   0.000 
 
            (0.806)   (0.931) 
 
Public  
                -0.014 
 
                (0.844) 
 
Transport 
                -0.003 
 
                (0.567) 
 
Wholesale 
                -0.006 
 
                (0.401) 
 
Retail  
                0.000 
 
                (0.986) 
 
Finance 
                -0.001 
 
                (0.765) 
 
Services 
                0.012 ** 
                (0.018) 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat 4.12 3.21 2.79 2.45 2.62 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.38 
N 74 74 74 74 74 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (3). The 
dependent variable is the abnormal bid-ask spread on the announcement day (ABAS) while the 
independent variables are: natural logarithm of closing price (Price); stock turnover on the announcement 
day (Turnover); stock price volatility on the announcement day (Var); natural logarithm of the market 
capitalisation at the end of the fiscal year prior to the breach (MarketCap); book-to-market ratio at the end 
of the fiscal year prior to the the breach (BMRatio); leverage ratio (Leverage); the percentage of CEO 
ownership (Ownership); natural logarithm of the number of records breached (BreachScale); a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm experienced a breach in the past, 0 otherwise (PriorBreach); dummy variables 
for the type of breach (Active, Stolen, Lost); dummy varibales for different industries (Public, 
Transportation, Wholesale, Retail, Finance, Services). OLS regressions with year fixed-effect and 
hetheroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. P-values reported in parethesis. *,**,*** Significance at 10, 
5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 10 
Regression analysis: abnormal turnover 
Variable Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
Intercept 
-0.006 
 
-0.010 ** -0.011 ** -0.009 ** -0.009 * 
(0.105)   (0.017)   (0.020)   (0.049)   (0.058) 
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Price 
0.001 * 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
 
(0.084)   (0.509)   (0.616)   (0.698)   (0.813) 
 
Bas 
0.114 ** 0.125 ** 0.122 ** 0.114 ** 0.092 * 
(0.032)   (0.020)   (0.024)   (0.036)   (0.069) 
 
Var 
0.052 
 
0.045 
 
0.050 
 
0.052 
 
0.076 
 
(0.165)   (0.230)   (0.192)   (0.185)   (0.120) 
 
MarketCap 
    0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
    (0.038)   (0.022)   (0.032)   (0.032) 
 
BMRatio 
    -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   -0.001 
 
    (0.317)   (0.268)   (0.282)   (0.340) 
 
Leverage 
  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.003  
  (0.590)  (0.721)  (0.854)  (0.601)  
Ownership 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.002  
  (0.898)  (0.971)  (0.988)  (0.126)  
BreachScale 
        0.000   0.000   0.000 
 
        (0.592)   (0.490)   (0.339) 
 
PriorBreach 
        -0.001   -0.002   -0.001 
 
        (0.335)   (0.307)   (0.444) 
 
Active 
            -0.001   -0.001 
 
            (0.739)   (0.805) 
 
Stolen 
            -0.002   -0.002 
 
            (0.318)   (0.400) 
 
Lost 
            0.001   -0.001 
 
            (0.736)   (0.733) 
 
Public 
                0.045 
 
                (0.118) 
 
Transport 
                0.000 
 
                (0.865) 
 
Wholesale 
                0.006 * 
                (0.082) 
 
Retail 
                0.001 
 
                (0.536) 
 
Finance  
                0.001 
 
                (0.563) 
 
Services 
                0.004 * 
                (0.083) 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat 1.99 1.90 1.72 1.87 1.91 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 
N 74 74 74 74 74 
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This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (6). The 
dependent variable is the abnormal stock turnover on the announcement day (ATURN) while the 
independent variables are: natural logarithm of closing price (Price); stock turnover on the announcement 
day (Turnover); stock price volatility on the announcement day (Var); natural logarithm of the market 
capitalisation at the end of the fiscal year prior to the breach (MarketCap); book-to-market ratio at the end 
of the fiscal year prior to the the breach (BMRatio); leverage ratio (Leverage); the percentage of CEO 
ownership (Ownership); natural logarithm of the number of records breached (BreachScale); a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm experienced a breach in the past, 0 otherwise (PriorBreach); dummy variables 
for the type of breach (Active, Stolen, Lost); dummy varibales for different industries (Public, 
Transportation, Wholesale, Retail, Finance, Services). OLS regressions with year fixed-effect and 
hetheroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. P-values reported in parethesis. *,**,*** Significance at 10, 
5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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The Effect of Data Breach Announcements Beyond The Stock Price: Empirical 
Evidence on Market Activity 
 
Highlights 
 Investigate effect of data breach announcements on market activity, i.e. bid-ask 
spread and trading volume.  
 Investigate data breach announcements as a potential source of asymmetric 
information  
 Data breach announcements found to have positive announcement day effect on 
market activity.  
 No abnormal informed trading evidenced before data breach announcements  
 Data breach sizes and type found to be factors in response to data breach 
announcements.  
